The marginal effect of bail decisions on failure to appear, imprisonment and crime

Sara Rahman

Applied Research in Crime and Justice Conference

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NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research


How does bail work in NSW?

Police

Refuse bail

Dispense with or grant bail

Introduction How does bail work in NSW?



Why do bail decisions matter?

Risks of granting bail:

- Defendant not appearing in court
- Defendant committing crime
- Interfering with witnesses/evidence

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
Costs of refusing bail:


- Costs of housing the offender in prison
- Personal costs for the defendant
- Potential signal of their criminality


Introduction The research question


We want to know:

- What is the incapacitation effect of bail decisions on:
 - Failure to appear
 - Offending on bail
- What is the signaling effect of bail decisions on prison sentences?









Recent research

Gupta, Hansman, and Frenchman (2016) - Journal of Legal Studies

Introduction Recent research

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Bail refusal:

- Increased likelihood of conviction
- No effect on recidivism
- No effect on failure to appear

Recent research

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Bail refusal:

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Dobbie, Goldin, and Yang (2018) -American Economic Review

Release on bail:

- Reduced likelihood of pleading guilty
- Reduced likelihood of a prison penalty
- Increased likelihood of failure to appear
- Increased likelihood of re-offending up to disposition but reduces that after disposition

Introduction Recent research

Didwania (2018) - Working paper

THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF PRETRIAL DETENTION: EVIDENCE FROM FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES

STEPHANIE HOLMES DIDWANIA* February 17, 2018

Introduction Recent research

Didwania (2018) - Working paper

THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF PRETRIAL DETENTION: EVIDENCE FROM FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES

> STEPHANIE HOLMES DIDWANIA* February 17, 2018

Release on bail:

- 67 per cent reduction in sentence length (1.1 months)
- Increases probability of a below-guidelines sentence by 67.6 percentage points

Section 2

Method

Data

Dataset construction

JusticeLink database

- First bail hearings
 - Magistrate
 - Date
 - Outcomes
 - Charges

Data

Dataset construction

JusticeLink database



- First bail hearings
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Re-offending Database (ROD)

- Demographic characteristics
- Criminal history
- Prison sentence
- Sentencing magistrate
- Convictions for failure to appear
- Further convictions

Data

Dataset construction

JusticeLink



Re-offending Database (ROD)



- Demographic characteristics
- Criminal history
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- Further convictions

- 42.362 bail hearings
- Period of analysis: 20 January 2015 -30 June 2018
- Adult defendants
- District/Local Court
- Different bail and sentencing magistrates
- >=20 decisions in a year

database



Outcomes

Date

Magistrate

• First bail hearings

Charges



Data Outcome variables

Failure to appear

Convicted of a failure to appear offence at finalisation

Offending on bail

Committed an offence between bail hearing date and finalisation

Imprisonment

Sentenced to imprisonment at finalisation

Data Treatment variable

A dummy variable for whether a person was granted bail (with or without conditions) at their first court bail hearing

Demographics

Age, Indigenous status, gender, SEIFA, remoteness

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Index charge

Violent, property, drug, traffic, other

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Priors

Penalties (Custodial, community orders, other) Offences (violent, property, drug, breach, traffic, other)

Demographics

Age, Indigenous status, gender, SEIFA, remoteness

Index charge

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Priors


Penalties (Custodial, community orders, other)
Offences (violent, property, drug, breach, traffic, other)

Fixed effects


Principal offence, time, location (court location, jurisdiction and police area)

Method


Instrumental variables estimation




Method Instrumental variables estimation



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Estimation

Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation

Estimate the effect of being granted bail on the outcome

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T_i + \beta X_i + \gamma + \epsilon$$

 T_i = whether someone is granted bail

 $X_i = individual$ -level controls

 $\gamma = {\sf fixed\ effects}$

 $\epsilon = {\sf error}$

Obtain the predicted probability of being granted bail based on judge leniency and other observed factors:

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 $Z_i = \text{judge leniency}$

 \hat{T}_i = predicted probability of being granted bail

 $X_i = \text{individual-level controls}$

 $\gamma = {\sf fixed \ effects}$

 $\epsilon = {\sf error}$

Method

Judge leniency as an instrumental variable

Residualised leave-one-out IV

A measure of the judge's leniency relating to all other cases than the index individual, adjusted for offence, location and time fixed effects

$$IV_{i}^{*} = \frac{R_{j}^{*} - R_{ij}^{*}}{D_{j} - D_{ij}}$$

where j is a judge, i is a person, R are the sum of residuals of the decision to grant bail, D is the sum of bail decisions

Method Tests of IV

Relevance of IV


The IV should be significantly related to the likelihood of release



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Relevance of IV

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


Method Other tests of IV

Relevance of IV

The IV should be significantly related to the likelihood of release

- · Positive relationship observed
- Partial F of first stage: 291.84



Method Tests of IV

Randomness

The IV is unrelated to individual characteristics (F=1.18, p-value=.179)

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Monotonicity

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Exclusion restriction

The IV should not affect the outcome other than through the bail decision


- Defendants do not choose their bail judges
- We exclude all defendants with the same bail and sentencing judge




Section 3

Results

Failure to appear



Failure to appear




bias)

 2SLS estimates a 9 percentage point increase in likelihood of failure to appear from granting bail


Failure to appear

Effect of additional releases



Failure to appear


Effect of additional releases



 This translates to a rate of failing to appear of 10.9% for additional releases compared to an average of 2.1% among those refused


Failure to appear

Effect of additional releases



- This translates to a rate of failing to appear of 10.9% for additional releases compared to an average of 2.1% among those refused
- There is an incapacitation effect of bail refusal on failure to appear


Offending on bail



OLS and 2SLS estimates are virtually identical


Offending on bail

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
 There is a significant effect of bail refusal on reducing crime

Imprisonment



 2SLS attenuates effect of granting bail on imprisonment from 20 percentage points to 10


Imprisonment



- 2SLS attenuates effect of granting bail on imprisonment from 20 percentage points to 10
- Once correcting for selection bias, the signalling effect of bail refusal on prison is 10 percentage points

Imprisonment

Effect of additional releases



 This translates to an average rate of imprisonment of 49 per cent on additional released defendants

Robustness checks

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Sensitivity in IV construction

Not sensitive to changing number of minimum judge decisions to 30

Subgroup analyses

District and Local Court

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Previous policy regime

Consistent when estimating on Pre-Bail Act 2013 data

• Bail refusal reduces failure to appear and offending on bail

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- Better prediction of offending on bail is worthwhile
- Findings are consistent with previous studies
- Limitations
 - Important to keep in mind that this relates to a small subset of offenders in NSW
 - Did not study post-finalisation offending